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Education at the Margins of the Political 
Abstract: 
This paper argues that the political can respond to that which exceeds it without reducing it 
to the same, and that public education is one of the most important places where this can 
happen. I present a rationale for public education to assist that which exceeds the political: 
singularity, solitude and difference. What I maintain is that the political must welcome this 
excess, especially through public education, or else it would not be possible to provide the 
educational context for that which might be of significance to individuals without having 
socio-political value. 
 
Introduction 
The political tends to be conceived of as the whole and its particulars: a state and its citizens. Public 
education is one of the ways in which the state accounts for its citizens by educating them in terms 
of the perceived good of the social whole. This perceived good is not simply that which is explicitly 
outlined in public education policy but also based on the ideological influences which the state 
perpetuates. The traits of neo-liberalism are perhaps those most common in contemporary public 
education, where socio-economic value becomes the dominant force directing state activity.  A clear 
and convincing argument is presented for this as being our contemporary condition in Michael 
Peters’ work, especially in “The new prudentialism in education: Actuarial rationality and the 
entrepreneurial self” (2005). This argument aside, existence exceeds the socio-political and there are 
aspects of all individuals and their relations which do too, however, the political, through public 
education, touches on that excess. Usually it touches on it through reducing it to its own logic, which 
means making existence determinable in terms of shared social value. The political frames the social 
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and manages it, even as the social influences the political (through elections, referenda, or even 
popular dissent or uprising). Through the frame of the political, individuals are only thought in terms 
of the aspects of their identity which are social. Aspects of an individual’s identity or experience 
which are asocial or even anti-social are sometimes dangerously vulnerable to the forces of political 
and social expediency, manifested most clearly in public education systems, where all that is of value 
is that which can be used to help students find their place on, or climb, the social ladder. The 
location of this issue can be traced at least as far back as Rousseau’s discussion of amour-propre and 
amour-de-soi in Emile, where ‘the man accustomed to the ways of society is always outside himself 
and knows how to live only in the opinion of others. And it is, as it were, from their judgment alone 
that draws the sentiment of him own existence.’ (Rousseau, 1987, 80-81). Public education presents 
a context where individuals are taught to judge their intelligence, their capacities, their motivations, 
and their goals through the opinion of others. The means for a conceptualisation of a self outside of 
socially valid exigencies are not explicitly supported or protected. Aspects of an individual’s 
existence and experience which are not socially valuable are implicitly labelled as a waste product. 
Ironically then, those that ‘fail’ in the education system and are forced to live with that stigma might 
also be those most likely to preserve non-conformist aspects of their identity. What is often missing 
in public education and society more generally is encouragement and support to maintain interests 
and aspects of a self which are not socially ‘valuable’ or accepted, such as being alone, listening to or 
playing unpopular or ‘unpalatable’ music, engaging in ‘unsavoury’ hobbies, doing things you are bad 
at and that hold no ‘future’, or activities that might ordinarily be classified as disruptive. 
I present a rationale for public education to assist that which exceeds the political: 
singularity. That is to say, aspects of individual experience which have no corresponding social value. 
Singularity is not the singularity of a ‘person’, it is the singularity of experiences which are not 
universalizable. What I maintain is that the political must welcome the singularities that exceed it, 
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especially through public education, or else it would not be possible to provide the educational 
context for that which might be of significance to individuals without having socio-political value. To 
be able to define the implications of this argument in terms of teaching practice, I also articulate a 
description of what I call the 'impartial educator', which is the educator who concerns him or herself 
with a singularly responsible form of education which exists outside of the usual 'partial' education 
directed towards helping the student achieve in terms of the socio-political. As such, the ‘partial’ 
take on special meaning in this paper (as it does in Arendt), whereby the partial is a part of the 
whole and the partial educator focuses on the aspects of an individual which directs itself towards 
the whole. Equally, the ‘impartial’ is that which is not directed towards the ‘whole’ or even 
considered to be part of any whole. The impartial educator directs themselves towards that which 
exists outside of social prescription and reproduction in educational contexts. Being an impartial 
educator does not preclude one from also being a partial educator, it is simply that the quality of 
impartiality allows the educator to teach on the margins of the political, instead of being confined 
within it. 
 The argument in this paper is at a distance from - and perhaps even quite contrary to – 
emancipatory or inclusive educational theories. Rather than attempting to free individuals from the 
chains of normative politics or include them in that politics regardless of their difference, an 
education at the margins of the political advocates for leaving people alone. This is of course not to 
say that public education should (or even could) abnegate its responsibility to educate individuals in 
the knowledge, skills and civic virtues relevant to historically contingent social realities – but it does 
mean that public education must be approached as much in terms of its limits as its content. The 
usual engagements with what is conceived of as the limits of public education tend to question or 
promote the validity of various authorities in requiring an education in subjects such as evolution 
and sex education, or the wearing or not wearing of the hijab or cross. These questions are beyond 
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the remit of this paper because, while they might seem to illustrate the ‘limits’ of the political in 
education, they are in fact key examples of where various political perspectives actually take hold of 
education and reduce it to their logic. It is, in fact, not a question of the limits of the political in 
education at all but rather one of what kind of political subjects are being constructed, or even 
‘reproduced’. In contrast, this paper advocates for a recognition and active intellectual defence of 
that which exceeds the political in education. This paper argues that, even if according to certain 
theoretical logic, we may always be subject to the political, political subjects are not all we are. For 
those readers who might welcome this claim with a shrug of the shoulders, or for those who might 
smile to themselves at its apparently tautological or platitudinous character, this paper is written 
especially for you.  
Definitions are key to the arguments made in this paper. The argument is itself about 
definitions, especially the definition of the difference between the meaning and use of the terms 
‘singular’ and ‘particular’ in political philosophy. Particularity defines an individual in terms of 
generality. The ‘general’ are the qualities and rights which apply to all particulars. The particular 
individual is understood only through their being a part of the ‘whole’ of the political. To be ‘partial’ 
in the context of the particular and the general would be to take a view that is in line with generality. 
Singularity defines an individual experience in terms of ‘negative generality’. The negatively general 
are the aspects of an individual experience which are not reducible to particularity. The singular 
must be impartially understood as unique, which would also mean understanding that there are 
things about them that cannot be understood. To be impartial in the context of the singular and the 
negatively general would be to take a view that is opposed to or separate from generality. This is the 
view of the impartial educator.  
 I emphasise particularity in politically endorsed education because the very reason for its 
existence is, generally speaking, to educate the citizen for their good and the social good.  The 
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rationale for public education is, unsurprisingly, founded on perpetuating the interests of the state. 
That is not to say that public education does not account for individuals but that it only does so in 
terms of their identity as a citizen, and therefore as a particular of the political whole.  Even if, as is 
now the fashion, public education attends to different kinds of individuals and their variable skills 
and interests, it only ever does so in terms of an assignable value, which accredits their specificity in 
way that reduces it to generality. Thus, whatever an educational activity exhibits is always thought in 
terms of how it can be reduced to the logic of accreditation and social accommodation. This is, for 
good reason, seen as being beneficial to the student: their differences can be used to provide them 
with an award which presents their individuality as having a discernible social value.  
Singularity, on the other hand, provides an unusual and productive way in which to think 
educational experience outside of social value while still being facilitated in the context of public 
education. The most explicit aspects of attention to singularity in education would – somewhat 
ironically – be in drawing attention the fact that the largest amount of the students’ public 
educational experience must treat them as a particular. That is to say, as a citizen and as a part of a 
whole. Students should be frequently reminded that their education is not only ‘for them’ and is 
rather designed primarily to support them in becoming good and productive citizens. It is only by 
repeatedly drawing their attention to this fact in all manner of educational contexts that it becomes 
possible for them to quite clearly see the margins of the political in their education. These 
‘reminders’ would not simply attempt to valorise their studies but would - perhaps somewhat 
cynically – reveal that their grades in compulsory subjects they may not like are sometimes more 
important than what they might actually learn from that subject. Once the political context of the 
majority of their educational experience becomes apparent, educational experiences which exceed 
the political domain might be recognised. This could support students to be able to see certain 
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aspects of their education as political and others as personal., perhaps allowing them to affirm 
certain seemingly purposeless experiences as personally educative.  
I argue that the personal is not always the political, especially once the singular has been 
decoupled from the particular and we no longer conceive of ourselves as unified beings, further 
unified in an organic social whole. If a teacher agreed with this view and wanted to enact the 
margins of the political more performatively in their practice, it might be facilitated by providing 
time in the weekly schedule for what might be called passive teaching, indirect education or 
education by ‘letting be.’ This would mean allowing access to spaces and resources for activities 
which would not be graded. The students would be under no obligation to produce work and any 
work they produce would not be assessed. They would receive a blanket ‘pass’ mark for attendance. 
The difference between the judicious and limited utilisation of this kind of performative practice in 
schools and the construction of an entire school which only operated this kind of practice is 
significant. Teachers would be present but passive, and available to answer questions or provide 
assistance. Teachers could respond to work if asked but not assert opinion or evaluation as a matter 
of course. If students decided they would prefer not to engage, and instead play, talk, do work for 
other classes, or remain unengaged, this would also be permissible. In a deep sense, this time would 
be considered ‘impartial.’ That is to say, there would be no expectation for students to exhibit 
anything which would be of value to them in terms of their political partiality. A.S. Neill’s Summerhill 
School (and his underpinning theories for it) attempted a far more dramatic political break with 
educational norms. The point of the practice at Summerhill school was that it made the students 
into democratic citizens. I make no such claim for passive teaching. The whole point is that it is 
completely unconcerned with the political ramifications of the education conducted therein. This is 
precisely why I suggest that its usage in formal educational settings should be judicious and limited, 
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as well as always being coupled with an explicit and more dominant focus on the politically oriented 
aspects of education.  
Hannah Arendt serves an important purpose in this paper by illustrating an educational and 
political tendency against which my argument in favour of singularity will be presented. This 
argument is presented despite the fact that Arendt argued against an explicitly political education; a 
perspective usefully challenged (in a way which is not incompatible with the argument I present) in 
Aaron Schutz and Mary G. Sandy (2015). I take this step because while contemporary reality does 
not reflect Arendt’s educational utopia, it does reflect her understanding of the political. An analysis 
of the aspect of her political thinking which best articulates the relationship between the general 
and particular (state and citizen) will be offered alongside critiques of it from the perspective of 
singularity. Aspects of her work act as a foil for my own argument, as well as for those of Claude 
Lefort, John Llewelyn and Pierre Rosanvallon; the three other major interlocutors in the 
development of my claims. The argument here is not that Arendt’s political thinking is wrong (in fact, 
several of her other writings present a perspective that would not be incompatible with that 
presented here) but rather that she reveals how political relations are played out in most 
contemporary and many classical political orders. It is the fact that she reflects the conditions of the 
political so successfully that makes her particularly helpful in locating its margins.  
 
The margins of the political 
Hannah Arendt, in the development of her Kantian political philosophy, perceives the political as an 
enclosed and reciprocally constructed realm, meaning that it is constructed on the basis that one is 
able to judge (or imagine) how others see things and that there is, in fact, a ‘world held in common’ 
(Arendt, 2007, p.198-199). This political world, which is also a stage, is defined as a perceivable 
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whole which gives meaning to the particulars. Thus, the teachers and students participating in a 
lesson in a classroom would be primarily perceivable in terms of a political whole. A student or 
teacher who acts to disrupt or ignores the whole comes under the judgment of it. For her, ‘The 
advantage the spectator has is that he sees the play as a whole, while each of the actors knows only 
his part or, if he should judge from the perspective of acting, only the part of the whole that 
concerns him. The actor is partial by definition’ (Arendt, 1982, p. 68-69).  Therefore, in this political 
theatre, citizens (such as Arendt herself) are the spectators who judge whether or not poets (the 
example she gives of an anti-social actor, which could just as easily be a teacher or a student) have 
misbehaved (which is a theme very much in the tradition of Plato’s argument for the censoring of 
the poets in Book II of The Republic). She argues that ‘there has always been trouble with them; they 
have often shown a deplorable tendency to misbehave’ (Arendt, 1982, p. 225). Again, a comment 
which easily aligns with those levelled against students by teachers or against teachers by politicians. 
The particulars, or individual citizens, are only given meaning by the whole in Arendt’s reading of 
Kant. If the actions of a particular actor are in contradistinction to the ‘good’ of that whole, then 
they are effectively judged to be bad citizens. The education that occurs for Arendt within this 
political theatre - which is analogous to the political more generally - is therefore the education of 
the particular in what it already is via a perceivable generality which allows for plurality without 
difference as a form of particularity without politically acknowledged uniqueness or singularity. For 
Arendt there is no margin to the political, either in or outside education. An individual is always a 
‘particular’ – and those who act ‘singularly’ will be judged harshly. 
It is in the first chapter of the last part of The HypoCritical Imagination that John Llewelyn 
engages with Hannah Arendt’s reading of Kant in her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. It is 
here that he sets out his understanding of the relationship between primary justice and ethics and 
draws out the significance of recognizing the singular before the particular and the general. He 
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argues against Arendt’s assertion that, ‘man’s dignity demands that he be seen (every single one of 
us) in his particularity and, as such, be seen - but without any comparison and independent of time – 
as reflecting mankind in general’ (Llewelyn, 2000, p. 147). He asks:  
How does one see a person as reflecting mankind in general without comparison? Is not 
seeing him or her as reflecting mankind in general comparing him or her, if only in general 
terms, as a case of humanity, that is to say, as a particular, meaning by this an instance 
falling under a concept? Is that not to treat him or her as one of a number, so as a number, 
not as a person – to treat him or her as personne, as a nobody, even if one does that in order 
to credit him or her with rights? (Llewelyn, 2000, p. 147) 
By emphasizing a general conception of humanity which is to be related to all particulars, Llewelyn 
argues that Arendt, through Kant, ignores singularity in favour of particularity of the general. As 
Llewelyn points out, by thinking ‘every single one of us’ as a particular rather than as singular, 
Arendt reduces the individual to a nobody, albeit a nobody with superficially equal rights. The ability 
for the political to afford rights is extremely important but sets aside how the political might account 
for that which exceeds it, by not accounting for it directly, but indirectly by recognising its own 
limits. It is the political without margin. It is the educational consumed by politics. As such, the right 
to education is not under scrutiny here but if that right is not accompanied by a certain attention to 
singularity then that right simply becomes a means to facilitate the reduction or transformation of 
the singular to the particular. The partial educator as actor teaches how to be a successful citizen, 
while the impartial educator teaches an individual in their singularity in a manner that is not 
politically prescribed.  By positing a situation where one is only able to think ethics in terms of 
general and particular, Arendt’s reading of Kant reduces the ethical to political totality, leaving no 
room for singularity. This is dangerous because the educator then becomes obligated to think the 
education of an individual in terms of social value for their own benefit. Attending to the educational 
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experience of the individual in terms of that which cannot be explicitly articulated or certified in 
terms of social value becomes entirely insignificant and a misuse of the educator and students’ time. 
The singularity of an individual’s experience is excised from public educational experience. It could 
be suggested that Arendt is here thinking politically and not in terms of ethics but my argument is 
that the political must account for the ethical which exceeds it. This is not a self-contradiction 
because the political can both prescribe and leave space for the ethical. In a classroom this is easily 
articulated in terms of educational effort expended on assisting students in achieving grades or 
reaching prescribed learning outcomes but also time afforded to activities which are not 
prescriptively outcome oriented. The educator can be both partial and impartial. The educator must 
attend to the right of the individual (as particular) to be educated in terms of the political 
(exemplified by helping them to achieve certifications) but impartiality implies that they might also 
have a different kind of ethical responsibility to the student. And further, that the student should 
have a right to be educated in the distinction between their particularity and singularity. Impartial 
education, or education without a prescribed or assignable social purpose, would still have to be 
taught in general even if it specifically refers to that which exceeds it. This excess is what Llewelyn 
goes on to explore in a philosophical context by asking whether or not there is something ‘higher 
than rights’ or ‘better than ethics’ which would be ‘the non-essential essence of the ethical that one 
could distinguish from the ethical in the Kantian sense by calling it proto-ethical’ (Llewelyn, 2000, p. 
147-148).  The spectator passes judgment and is defined by their partiality with regard to the whole, 
while, for Llewelyn, the experience of the ‘face-to-face encounter’ implies an ethics beneath or 
before the relation between the general and particular. Llewelyn’s Levinasian notion of ‘primary 
justice’ is an ethico-existential justice which operates only in the singular (Llewelyn, 2000, p. 147).  
 
Singularity 
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In Democracy and Political Theory, Claude Lefort argues that, ‘[t]he disturbing thing about Hannah 
Arendt – and it is the sign of a shortcoming – is that, whilst she rightly criticizes capitalism and 
bourgeois individualism, she never shows any interest in democracy as such, in modern democracy’ 
(Lefort, 1988, p. 55). For Lefort this is significant as democracy was the first regime which had been 
able to distance itself ‘from the fantasy of an organic society’ (Lefort, 1988, p. 55). The problem with 
Arendt is that she replaces the ‘One’ which is the ‘supreme guide’ (or fascist dictator) with the ‘One’ 
that is the plurality of spectators for whom there is always a shared right and wrong. As a 
consequence, the politics she derives from Kant suffers from much of the same critique of the 
‘whole’ that totalitarianism is subject to. Hers is simply the replacement of more explicit state 
control with a perceived common good; beyond that the critique remains remarkably similar (a 
parallel point has been argued in terms of Marxism by Wim Weymans (2012)). This suggestion can 
be illustrated through an analogy between Arendt’s accusation of the misbehaviour of the poets 
(which I analogised with teachers and students earlier in this paper) and a section from a chapter of 
Lefort’s Complications: Communism and the Dilemmas of Democracy titled ‘The Fabrication of the 
Social’. There he writes of Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago:  
Solzhenitsyn reported a commissar’s remarks to a Communist director of a combine who 
was sent for the second time to a camp…The two protagonists were joined by an 
indissoluble bond, but the relationship was not personal. The party no longer appeared as a 
power far above them, since circumstances could have made them exchange places. The 
accused did not cease to be included in the we that excluded him. (Lefort, 2007, p. 167) 
The accused is only ever seen as a particular to be judged in terms of the general and all particulars 
are in this way interchangeable and, in every crucial political sense, the same. For Arendt also, in 
terms of judgment, the poet is a bad citizen and misbehaves according to that which supposedly 
includes him even as he acts against it and isolates himself from it. His individual citizenship is 
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entirely synthesized with the political whole and defined by its generality and thus becomes entirely 
negated when he is not understood. Despite this, he is still subject to the judgment of the 
spectators. Because the political is itself aesthetic for Arendt, any aesthetic action (perhaps any 
action whatsoever) which does not convey or endorse the logic of whole as perceived by the plural 
spectators would – at least in terms of the political - be ‘deplorable’ (Arendt, 2007, p. 225). The poet, 
like the Communist director, is at once included in his particularity and isolated in his singularity 
from that which accuses him of misbehaviour. Teachers and students are in a similar predicament. 
Any educational activity – or any activity performed in an educational context at all – would be 
considered deplorable if it could not be conceived of as serving the political whole. Although most 
educational theorists might be loath to admit that they follow this logic, it is a danger that befalls 
any educational theory which lets itself be guided by even the vaguest positive notion of the social 
good. My claim is that if there are no limits to the political in their conception of education then 
their ‘inclusion’ of others is precisely an exclusion of everything that makes those others ‘other’. 
The idea Lefort draws from Solzhenitsyn, that ‘The accused did not cease to be included in 
the we that excluded him’ (Lefort, 2007, p. 167) therefore has remarkable implications for the 
political aspect of education. A disengagement or rejection of any part of public educational 
experience will taint a person in terms of public education and its political value. To be unsuccessful 
in, excluded or expelled from, or advised or forced to discontinue public education, marks a person 
through their lack of certifications. Even focusing on activities which do not have a conceivable 
purpose in terms of the social good becomes politically questionable. A person is judged in terms of 
what they do not have and what they do not do. The system includes and passes judgement on 
those it excludes. This practice is endemic to public education (or any politically valued education 
which involves certification) partly because of the necessity for schools to be efficient in the 
production of ‘certified’ citizens. To a great extent, schools are judged in terms of how successful 
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they are at producing politically valued outcomes. They are held accountable by means of abstracted 
general criteria, which the particular students are more or less successful at achieving. Singularity is 
an excess which, in terms of the political, schools only need to attend to if a student is not exhibiting 
their particularity effectively enough.  
One of the supposed benefits of thinking every particular as part of a whole or organic 
society is that no one is lost in the crowd, which Lefort points out is a common critique of modern 
democracy, fuelling, ‘both a horror of anonymity and a longing for an imaginary community whose 
members experience the joys of being together’ (Lefort, 1988, p. 181).. It is this anonymity as a form 
of negative generality in relation to a defence of the solitary, which emphasises co-existence of 
singularity and particularity. He asks why it should be denied that there is  
a link between solitude and anonymity, why deny that recognition of the other as being 
shaped in our likeness implies that we must also accept that we cannot know the other, and 
why, finally divorce the truth of association from the truth of isolation, when we should be 
taking them together? The answer is obvious: it is as though, for almost two hundred years 
we had been forced to oscillate between making an apologia for individualism and making 
an apologia for mass democracy, between disavowing one and disavowing the other. (Lefort, 
1988, p. 181-182). 
 What Lefort here locates as the ‘recognition of the other being shaped in our likeness’ has much 
more in common with Llewelyn’s reading of Levinas than Kant or Arendt’s generality reciprocally 
reflected in every particular. From Lefort’s perspective there is no longer the necessity to make a 
choice between self and society or individualism and mass democracy because that choice is illusory 
and not one we are actually able to make. In the same way, there is no need to choose between 
particularity and singularity; one can be both. In fact, it would be difficult to conceive of many 
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situations where one would not be both, even if the political and educational discourse did 
everything it could to restrict or ignore this decoupling. 
We are at one and the same time isolated and associated, pre-political and political, ethical 
and aesthetic: singular and particular. Which is why this is also what Llewelyn neologistically calls an 
‘aesthethic’ (Llewelyn, 2000, p.170-181) understanding of existence and in Lefort’s words it takes the 
truth of ‘association alongside the truth of isolation.’ It is these features that Lefort implicitly refers 
to when he asks in Writing: The Political Test if it really is  
so difficult to hold two ideas at once? Can’t one recognize that the history of democracy 
cannot undo the histories of the State, of capitalism, and of technology, and that it is ruled 
by principles that are its own? When we said that democracy is a form of society, that 
doesn’t mean that in democracy the signification of everything that comes to pass and 
shapes the life of a people is neatly wrapped up in it. (Lefort, 2000, p. 272)  
Especially when theorized in the light of Llewelyn’s critique of particularity it becomes clear that, 
while singularity cannot be reduced to the political and is constituted partly by the condition of 
isolation, democratic politics allows for the spaces within which singularity can generatively 
interrupt it and inform it from the margins of the political without, as in Arendt’s reading, being 
expelled for misbehaviour. 
 
Impartiality 
Unlike Arendt, Pierre Rosanvallon does not believe that ‘the actor is partial by definition’ (Lefort, 
2000, p. 68-69). In Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity he puts great emphasis 
on the necessity of creating conditions for the institution of impartial actors and bodies. Not only are 
they often perceived by the public, somewhat ironically, as having greater democratic legitimacy 
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than elected representatives and bodies, their decisions and actions are able to be singular and 
responsive to singularity. The creation of these conditions is therefore necessary to be able to 
facilitate the impartial educator. The educator exists on the margin between the political and 
unpolitical, and, as such, can be both partial and impartial. Impartiality is that within the political 
which can respond to that outside of it, without reducing it to the same. Arendt’s Kantian emphasis 
on the whole and the general removes the condition of independence which is necessary for 
impartiality. For Rosanvallon independence is a status, whereas impartiality is a quality (Rosanvallon, 
2011, p. 94-95). The status must be instituted before the conditions exist wherein the quality can be 
practiced. 
While making a point totally opposite to Arendt’s thinking, Rosanvallon uses a markedly 
Arendtian (and therefore Kantian) language to explain the necessity of independence of an impartial 
actor as well as the social influence on its legitimacy:  
One can be independent of the government hierarchy and still entirely biased on the issues 
that one is charged with overseeing. Independence is an intrinsic general characteristic of a 
function or institution, but impartiality is a characteristic of a particular actor or decision-
maker. Impartiality requires independence, but independence by itself is not enough to 
achieve impartiality. (Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 94-95) 
The conditions affecting the impartial actor become almost explicitly Arendtian, recalling general 
judgment on the particular actor, when he makes clear that the actor gains their legitimacy through 
its actions because ‘[a]lthough an authority may claim a presumption of impartiality, it still needs to 
prove in practice that such a presumption is justified’ (Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 96). For Rosanvallon, 
impartiality ‘needs to be perpetually constructed and validated. The legitimacy of impartiality needs 
to be fought for at all times’ (Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 95). To think the singular, the independent and 
the impartial is to think outside or without the logic of the general and the particular. And so, 
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although the impartial actor requires legitimacy afforded to it by the public, it must first be 
independent. Equally a supposedly impartial actor might be considered illegitimate by a small 
number of individuals in terms of singular need, while being accepted as impartial by the majority. 
Clearly the accusation of its illegitimacy would therefore not be representative of judgment of the 
general but rather of the singular.  
 Educators in public education systems cannot avoid their partial role in service to a 
historically contingent political ‘good’. A significant aspect of their professional responsibility is to 
equip their students with skills, knowledge and civic virtues which allow them to succeed in terms of, 
and serve, the normatively conceived social good. This is the aspect of teaching which those working 
in the Arendtian tradition (as well as many of those working with ideas from Plato, Aristotle, Kant, 
Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and Dewey) conceive of so clearly. They are right to draw attention to it and 
right to attend to the debates within the sphere of the general and universal. They are also right to 
think of the teacher and student as particulars. However, as I have hoped to show, the emphasis on 
the individual as a particular should not come at the cost of also considering that individual’s 
singularities. And it is this aspect of existential clarification that the educator can also be conceived 
of as having a responsibility towards. In this way, educators must themselves be conceived of as 
singularities, independent from the generalising political system which they also represent. 
Educators must be impartial as well as partial actors, as only then can they respond to singularity as 
singularities. It is this recognition of this relationship between singularities as well as particulars that 
distinguishes the impartial from the neutral. 
Impartial actors exist to avoid the fate of all politics being subject to the general and instead 
being able to respond to the singular in terms of law. As such, impartiality must also be thought of as 
being entirely distinct from neutrality. Rosanvallon argues that impartiality ‘does not exist in the 
abstract but is always related to an action or decision. It is therefore different from mere neutrality, 
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which often means simply detachment or even reluctance or refusal to intervene. By contrast, an 
impartial individual is an active third party who takes part in civic affairs and plays a constructive role 
of a particular kind’ (Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 95). Thus, because the political is instituted (differently in 
different contexts) via precedents such as constitutions and judgments, there must be those who 
actively and impartially represent the principles of these precedents. There is also, of course, a 
singularity involved in the judgment of the impartial actor which does not conform to Arendt’s logic 
of the spectator as a particular representative of the whole. As such, the judgment of the impartial 
actor adds something new rather than reducing something to the same.  
In another of Rosanvallon’s readings of Arendt, the judge ‘is a spectator, to be sure, but an 
active and engaged spectator, whose action helps to institute and regulate the life of the city’ 
(Rosanvallon, 2008, 235). In this slightly earlier reading from Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age 
of Distrust, the judge, seemingly at once partial and impartial - actor and spectator - erases the 
distance between the stage and the audience. Articulation of impartial action is most obviously 
exemplified by the judge in a courtroom but the example given by Rosanvallon has a much broader 
reach. He argues that German ordoliberalism (‘Their idea was to structure economic activity in such 
a way as to guarantee social stability’ (Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 117)) sits within the realm of 
constituent impartiality and is separated from constituted partisan politics. That is not to say that it 
is unpolitical or purely spectatorial. Instead, it is the utilisation of constituted power as a means to 
increase the stability of constituent power, this constituent power then being an example of 
constituent impartiality. In terms of education this could be seen as using the constituted power of 
school policy to increase the constituent power of teachers; or, even, of a teacher occasionally 
creating a pedagogical context where the students can significantly express their individual 
constituent powers. In both cases the institution or utilisation of the impartiality of the educator is 
what is protected by the positive constitutional powers. The positive protects the negative. Teachers 
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and school administrators should not be put off attending to singularity because they can only do so 
alongside the general and the particular. All exist in consort. To reject the opportunities of 
constituent impartiality because it somehow represents constituted and partial political power is to 
begin the process of disallowing any constituent impartiality. This reduces the entire socio-political 
realm to the theatrical enactment of agonism and competition, wherein only the judgment of the 
plural spectators is both passive and impartial. To confine impartiality to the inactive or purely 
spectatorial is to remove any notion of active impartiality from the political altogether. Individuals 
do not become particulars just because they act. This is where Arendt’s chastisement of the 
‘misbehaving poets’ is again so revealing. She forces them into a logic where they are judged as 
being socially corruptive, while all the time they operate under an entirely different logic. Of course, 
the distinction that Arendt makes between partiality and impartiality is based on her conviction that 
a political whole is made up of particular manifestations of the general.  And so, the problem here is 
not the logic of the general and the particular but rather a logic of the general and particular which 
completely ignores, erases, rejects or punishes the singular. As Llewelyn, Lefort, and Rosanvallon 
show, the political and educational logic of the general and particular can accommodate the 
singular, it is simply that Arendt, like so many others before and after her, doesn’t let it.  
 
Negative generality 
A judgment can serve the function of being exemplary and somewhat pedagogical but must first and 
foremost be considered in its singularity. The decision of a judge is not partial or particular, it is 
singular. But its singularity is not just the singularity of the judge that matters but rather the singular 
relation between the judge and judged. Llewelyn (and Levinas) would go so far as to say the relation 
is asymmetrical and is grounded in the singularity of the other rather than the same. This relation is 
not an aggregate generality which exists as the product of plural spectators, which, like electoral 
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legitimacy, in Rosanvallon’s view, rests on ‘on popular recognition’ and represents an ‘aggregate 
generality, a quantitative social weight’ (Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 97). It is closer to the ‘negative 
generality’ which he conceives of in terms of impartiality, seeing it as ‘implicit in the fact that no one 
should benefit from a privilege or advantage. In a divided society, where an aggregative generality of 
identification can no longer be taken for granted because the general interest remains in doubt and 
subject to pressure from many different interest groups, there is a greater tendency to adhere to a 
negative-procedural form of generality (Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 97). It is actually much more to do 
with avoiding ‘being swayed by public opinion’ than representing it and more to do with have one’s 
individual situation ‘taken into account and fully assessed’ than being included (Rosanvallon, 2011, 
p. 98). Negative generality is the generality of unique singularities, many of whom quite often want 
to or would benefit from being left to their own devices. Negative generality helps to show why we 
should not focus on ‘including’ others in terms of anything but the general and particular. It is a 
reminder that we are all always somewhat excluded and that exclusion is precisely what makes us 
who we are and also what makes our education our own as much as the state’s.  
The recognition of negative generality could be perceived as the institutional recognition of 
the unsocial power of citizens through ‘treating all issues according to dictates of law and reason’ 
(Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 98). The decisions made by impartial institutions are considered impartial 
because they are not made in terms of the general and the particular, where the singular is 
regulated by the general as if it were always, only, and ever a particular. Instead, each individual is 
treated singularly before the law and not as a reflection of the whole of mankind. The legal system is 
also not the ‘general’, it is rather the provisional means for doing justice to the singular. Negative 
generality signifies the existence of a ‘power’ which cannot be taken to exhibit the quality of 
generality. In passing, Rosanvallon articulates this power in terms of Claude Lefort’s concept of ‘the 
empty place’ or lieu vide. However, while negative generality and the empty place have much in 
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common, for Lefort, the empty place is formulated as that which takes the place of divine law or its 
mediation (Lefort, 2007, p. 991). Negative generality goes a step further by indicating everything 
that cannot be reduced to positive totality. Read together, the empty place and negative generality 
provide the tools for thinking that which defies origin and presence. Natural law, divine law and 
general law are erased and replaced by a provisional and responsive law which attempts to do 
justice to the singular.  
Rosanvallon has shown how those working in the legal system can accommodate for and 
respond to it, while I have attempted to show – via a discussion of the decoupling of the singular and 
particular – how educators can also think about doing so. It is in fact almost as if there is a reversal of 
Arendt’s position, replacing the plural spectator with the singular judgment. Citizens, individually or 
in groups, are more likely to be ‘partial’ than impartial, while impartial actors or institutions act at a 
distance from citizens. This distance is crucial in being able to facilitate social justice. In Rosanvallon’s 
view ‘[t]he influence of special interests and pressure groups has increased for structural reasons. In 
order to rein them in, the most effective strategy is to create institutions whose role is to defend 
negative generality, because it is no longer possible to conceive of society as a positive totality’ 
(Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 98). Schools and universities must join these institutions in defending 
negative generality if they want to do anything but create citizens who are valued only – and 
sometimes even in their own eyes - in terms of their reflection of the social good. This paper has 
argued that there is no conceivable whole or absolutely applicable generality, even though there are 
many educational theorists, philosophers, political parties, and pressure groups who would argue 
otherwise, which is why ‘the socialization of power in a negative form is needed as a corrective to 
the shortcomings of the positive form’ (Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 99). 
 
Conclusion 
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The argument I have made would suggest that what public education requires from political 
philosophy today is a neutral conception of the negative. That which cannot or is not intended to be 
understood in terms of positive representation should not simply be conceived of as bad. The 
negative aspect of the singular must be articulated in general terms, first and foremost by moving 
away from the emphasis on the citizen as being primarily constituted as a part of a whole. This 
would form a part of the positively constituted political system’s creation of conditions for the 
negative which exceeds it. The positive must protect the negative. As Rosanvallon argues, the role of 
socially legitimate impartial actors would be crucial in achieving the responsiveness to singularity 
that such a system requires. However, such a system also requires the means for allowing 
singularities to remain at a distance from the social.  
As far as the political is concerned, the world we share must also account for the world(s) we 
don’t share. Public education is one of the means by which this can and does occur. The political and 
the unpolitical coexist –this is an existential fact - but it is up to the political to account for and 
create its own margins, one of which is marked by the philosophy and practice of education.  
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